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Recent Developments

NEWMANv. STATE:
An Attorney's Disclosure Under Rule 1.6 ofthe Maryland Rules of
Professional Conduct Does Not Defeat a Client's Assertion of the
Attorney-Client Privilege
By: Julia J. Messick
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held an attorney's
disclosure under Rule 1.6 of Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct
("MRPC") does not defeat a client's assertion of the attorney-client
privilege. Newman v. State, 384 Md. 285, 306, 863 A.2d 321, 333
(2004). In so holding, the Court concluded that an attorney who
discloses information in order to prevent harm to others could not be
compelled to testify as to that disclosure unless his or her client waives
the attorney-client privilege. !d.
In 1999, Elsa Newman ("Newman") and Arlen Slobodow
("Slobodow"), parents of two children ("Lars" and "Herbie"), began
divorce and custody proceedings. Stephen Friedman ("Friedman")
represented Newman during the hearings.
In spring 2001, at
Friedman's request, Margery Landry ("Landry") attended meetings
between Friedman and Newman to provide a "cool head in the room."
!d. at 291, 863 A.2d at 324. During one meeting, Landry and Newman
discussed harming one ofNewman's children and blaming Slobodow.
On August 31,2001, Newman said to Friedman, "[y]ou know I
don't have to kill both children. I only need to kill Lars because I can
save Herbie, and then [Slobodow] will go to jail and get what he
deserves because he is a criminal, and I can at least save Herbie." !d.
Shortly thereafter, Friedman disclosed Newman's statement to Judge
Scrivener, the head of the Montgomery County Circuit Court Family
Division. Judge Scrivener informed Judge Ryan, the judge presiding
over the custody trial, and Judge Ryan ordered Friedman's appearance
as Newman's counsel stricken.
On January 7, 2002, prior to the custody trial, Landry broke
into Slobodow's home and, as he lay in his bed, shot Slobodow once
in the leg. Slobodow pulled off Landry's mask and Landry fled the
scene. Landry subsequently pled guilty to assault, burglary, reckless
endangerment, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and
obliterating the serial number on a gun.
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On April 4, 2002, Newman pled not guilty to conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit assault in the
first degree. At a pretrial hearing on June 28, 2002, the trial court
determined Friedman could be compelled to testify because his
disclosure under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC waived the attorney-client
privilege. Newman objected to the court's decision to allow Friedman
to testify at trial. During his testimony, Friedman disclosed both
Newman's statement to him and to Landry regarding the harming of
one ofNewman's children.
On August 6, 2002, Newman was found guilty of conspiracy to
commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, assault in
the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and use of a handgun in
the commission of a felony. The Circuit Court of Maryland for
Montgomery County denied Newman's Motion for a New Trial.
Subsequently, Newman appealed to the Court of Special Appeals,
which upheld the trial court's conviction. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted Newman's petition for writ of certiorari.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying on the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts' reasoning in Purcell v. District Attorney for
the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440-41 (Mass. 1998), held that an
attorney's disclosure to prevent future harm to others does not waive
the attorney-client privilege. Newman, 384 Md. at 306, 863 A.2d at
333. In its analysis, the Court of Appeals distinguished the attorneyclient privilege, which applies to client communications, from
confidentiality of client information under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC,
which applies to the attorney's general duty to protect his or her
client's secrets. !d. at 302-03, 863 A.2d at 331.
Moreover, the Court held that communications subject to the
attorney-client privilege cannot be judicially compelled, whereas
confidential information under Rule 1.6 of the MRPC may be
judicially compelled. !d. at 304-05, 863 A.2d at 332. In the instant
case, the Court held that because Newman's statement to Friedman
was a "communication between the client and attorney" it was
protected by the attorney-client privilege and therefore could not be
judicially compelled. !d. at 306, 863 A.2d at 333.
Further, the Court of Appeals determined Friedman's
witnessing of Newman and Landry's conversation was protected by
the attorney-client privilege. !d. at 308-09, 863 A.2d at 335. Quoting
Rosati v. Kuzman, 660 A.2d 263, 266-67 (R.I. 1995), the Court held
the attorney-client privilege extends to situations where "the client
reasonably underst[ ands] the conference to be confidential
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notwithstanding the presence of third parties." Newman, 384 Md. at
307, 863 A.2d at 333. Thus, because Newman reasonably understood
her meetings with Friedman and Landry to be confidential, her
communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege. !d. at
307, 863 A.2d at 334.
Citing E.I. duPont Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351
Md. 396, 416, 718 A.2d 1129, 1139 (1998), the Court acknowledged
that in most cases the presence of a third-party during an attorneyclient meeting will destroy the attorney-client privilege. Newman, 384
Md. at 306, 863 A.2d at 333. However, relying on the analysis of the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in Rosati, 660 A.2d 263, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland found Newman did not waive her attorney-client
privilege by allowing Landry to join her meetings with Friedman.
Newman, 384 Md. at 308, 863 A.2d at 334. The Court reasoned, citing
Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, 359 Md. 671, 691, 756 A.2d
526, 537 (2000), because Friedman, not Newman, suggested Landry
be present during meetings, Newman's attorney-client privilege was
never waived. Newman, 384 Md. at 308, 863 A.2d at 334. According
to the Court of Appeals, the attorney-client privilege may not be
waived by the attorney, but instead must be waived by the client. !d.
at 308, 863 A.2d at 334.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals explicitly adopted the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 309, 863
A.2d at 335. In so doing, the Court determined a client is prohibited
from seeking "advice or aid in the furtherance of a crime or fraud"
from his or her attorney. Id. Although Friedman testified that he felt
as if he was being "sucked into their [Newman and Landry] plan," the
Court found no evidence to demonstrate Newman intended to solicit
Friedman's assistance. !d. at 312, 863 A.2d at 337. Thus, because
Newman did not seek the "advice or assistance" of Friedman in her
discussion of the crime, the crime-fraud exception did not apply. !d. at
311-12, 863 A.2d at 336.
In Newman v. State, the Court of Appeals not only determined
the attorney-client privilege prevails over MRPC Rule 1.6 in relation
to attorney testimony at trial, but also adopted and defined the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The Court
demonstrated Maryland's dedication to protecting the attorney-client
relationship and ensuring attorney-client communications remain
candid and allow open disclosure. Moreover, the Court enabled
attorneys to protect third parties from possible harm, while ensuring
attorneys will not be forced to testify against their clients.
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